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Abstract: 
 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) and transitional justice are increasingly viewed as 
mutually supporting methodologies in post-conflict situations, yet the relationship 
between them is largely underexplored, even if they share many of the same goals: 
accountability for past crimes, capacity building to strengthen the rule of law, and 
deterrence. This article traces and analyzes the inter-institutional division of labor 
between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in 
Kosovo, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and 
the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) concerning police reform and 
transitional justice processes in Kosovo.  
 
Transitional justice and SSR are critical in post-conflict settings, particularly when it 
comes to the reform of judicial systems, intelligence services, police, correctional 
systems, and the military, and addressing systemic massive human rights abuses 
committed by individuals representing these institutions. Accordingly, the SSR and 
transitional justice nexus deserves a special attention from the academic community. 
International efforts in Kosovo to build a multiethnic police force provide an interesting 
case study. After briefly summarizing the evolution of cooperation on SSR and 
transitional justice matters between different international organizations in Kosovo, the 
paper provides an overview of the literature on transitional justice, SSR and police 
reform, outlines the role of international organizations in establishing the police service, 
and discusses the process of recruiting minorities into the force. Following a discussion 
of some of the obstacles and challenges associated with building and reforming the 
police, the final section of the paper discusses the linkage between SSR and transitional 
justice and concludes with a summary of key findings.   
 
 
Paper prepared for delivery at the 2011 European Union Studies Association 
Biennial Meeting, March 3-5, 2011, Boston, MA, USA. 
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The Evolution of International Cooperation Concerning SSR and Transitional 
Justice in Kosovo: A Summary 
 
UNMIK’s mandate was extensive and unprecedented both in scope and structural 
complexity. As authorized by the UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 of 10 June 1999, 
UNMIK’s mandate included establishing an interim civilian administration including 
police, promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in 
Kosovo, creating a democratic political atmosphere respectful of human rights, 
repatriating over one million refugees, supporting the reconstruction of infrastructure and 
the economic system, maintaining civil law and order, promoting human rights, and 
ensuring safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.1
UNMIK was responsible for coordinating the reconstruction efforts of all 
international agencies operating in Kosovo. It was designed with a four pillar structure: 
Police and Justice (pillar I) and Civil Administration (pillar II) were under the direct 
control of UNMIK. The OSCE was in charge of the Democratization and Institution-
Building (pillar III), and the EU was responsible for the Reconstruction and Economic 
Development pillar (pillar IV). Placed outside of the pillar structure, NATO’s Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) mission was and still is responsible for providing a secure environment in 
Kosovo.  
 UNMIK also tried 
to facilitate a political process to resolve the final status question.  
Under Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework established by UNMIK Regulation 
2001/9, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) were excluded from 
exercising certain responsibilities, including the development of the security 
infrastructure.2 This task was reserved for the UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG) in Kosovo. To accomplish this task, UNMIK and OSCE (through pillars 
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I and III, respectively) were assigned the responsibility for creating a police force, the 
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) in Kosovo.  
The different international institutions devised a preliminary form of division of 
labor involved in building the peace in Kosovo. At the end of the conflict in Kosovo in 
1999, no other international organization besides NATO had sufficient manpower to 
tackle the myriad number of tasks in this sensitive post-conflict environment. In this 
power vacuum, KFOR “had no choice but to perform a number of civilian tasks, from 
policing duties to running electricity plants” in addition to its security-related tasks (San 
2005, p. 9). These were then gradually transferred to either UNMIK and later on to 
EULEX or Kosovar authorities, although KFOR continues to support them as necessary.  
UNMIK provided the general framework for international institutions’ 
collaboration. Beginning in 1999, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo was responsible for 
supervising the progress of democratization, the creation of institutions, the protection of 
human rights, and the promotion of the rule of law, including the establishment of a 
judicial system in Kosovo, and monitored compliance with international human rights 
standards.3 The OSCE trained the new police force in Kosovo through the Kosovo Police 
Service School (KPSS) in Vushtrri (Vucitrn), established in July 1999. As more and more 
of its goals were accomplished, UNMIK’s mission was modified in 2006, and the pillar 
structure was largely abandoned as more responsibilities were transferred to the local 
authorities (Scheye 2008). After the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in 
February 2008, UNMIK’s mission was “reconfigured”, and the names of Kosovo’s 
security institutions were changed. For example, the KPS became the Kosovo Police 
(KP). Responsibility for assisting Kosovo’s judicial authorities and law enforcement 
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agencies in developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system, 
police force and customs service was transferred from UNMIK to EULEX, which 
reached its initial operational capability in December 2008. Since then, EULEX is 
responsible for supervising the KP, and encouraging greater minority participation within 
the force.  
To date, the KPS and its successor KP have demonstrated good progress in 
recruiting the Kosovo Serbs and the other ethnic minorities into their ranks, a significant 
if underappreciated dimension of reconciliation integral to the success of SSR. According 
to the latest reports, of the KP, about ten percent of the force is comprised of Kosovo 
Serbs, and another six percent represent the other ethnic minorities in Kosovo, including 
the Roma, Askhali, Egyptian, Bosniak, and Turks. As put by one scholar, the KPS has 
been the “crown jewel of the international community’s initiatives in Kosovo” (O’Neill 
2002, p. 114).  
Literature Review 
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines transitional justice 
as “a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights”, which “seeks 
recognition for victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and 
democracy.”4 Transitional justice emerged as both a field of practice and scholarly 
inquiry in the 1980s and 1990s in response to dramatic political changes occurring in 
Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and South Africa. In each case, the transition 
to democracy included public demands to acknowledge and redress human rights abuses 
committed by former regimes. Since then, a variety of mechanisms have been developed 
to confront legacies of abuse (e.g. gross civil, political and other human rights violations, 
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genocide and other war crimes, sexual violence, torture, disappearances) in times of 
transition, whether from authoritarianism to democracy or from war to peace. These 
include truth commissions, institutional reform, amnesty, vetting, dismissals, reparations, 
rehabilitation, memorialization, and reconciliation projects. Regardless of which 
approach or combinations of approaches are implemented, all of them share a common 
set of mutually reinforcing goals: promoting  justice, accountability, reconciliation, and 
the rule of law; deterring future human rights violations; establishing democratic 
institutions; restoring dignity to those who suffered abuse; and memorializing those who 
perished.  
Transitional justice scholarship has evolved quickly since the early 1990s.5
A similar trajectory can be observed in the literature addressing security sector 
reform. “Security Sector Reform” is a comparatively new concept, emerging out of the  
Civil-Military Relations (CMR) literature (Chuter 2006; Edmunds 2007; Bruneau & 
Matei 2008), and rooted in what many scholars see as  a convergence of events occurring 
in the 1990s (Brzoska 2000; Sedra 2006; Edmunds 2007; Brzoska & Law 2007). These 
include donor country anxiety about conflict and insecurity hindering sustainable 
development in the developing world (Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2002; Law & 
 
Initially, the literature focused heavily on the judicial dimensions of transitional justice, 
with legal scholars making some of the most important original contributions to the field 
(Adams 1993; Benomar 1993; Cohen 1995; Nino 1991; Orentlicher 1991; Roht-Arriaza 
1990). Moving beyond a narrow legal focus, the field now includes detailed analyses of 
the various mechanisms of transitional justice, including truth commissions, vetting and 
lustration, amnesties, reparations, and public memory efforts.  
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Myshlovska 2008; Brzoska 2000); immediate post Cold War concerns about excessive 
military spending and a desire to redirect defense targeted financial resources to 
development related projects (Brzoska 2000, 2003; Hänngi 2009); a new emphasis on 
reforming weak and corrupt institutions during the democratic transitions in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Law & Myshlovska 2008; Hänngi 2009); Western governments’ desire 
to promote good governance and democratic civil-military relations in countries 
undergoing political transitions, and then expanding the focus to non-military facets of 
the security sector, including police, border guards and judicial institutions (Brzoska 
2000; Chanaa 2002; Hänngi 2009); the emergence of the “human security” paradigm, 
that focuses on the safety of citizens from a variety of threats (Hänggi 2003; Sedra 2006; 
Doelle & de Harven 2008; Ball & Hendrickson 2009); and finally, the expansion of tasks 
associated with peacebuilding in post conflict settings (Brzoska 2000; Law & 
Myshlovska 2008). 
Several themes emerge in this body of literature. First, there is wide agreement 
that the term is still evolving, multidimensional and contested (Edmunds 2007; Hänngi 
2004; Hänngi & Scherrer 2008). Indeed, security sector reform has come to mean many 
things to many people, not to mention international organizations and states. For 
example, the 2008 UN Report of the Secretary General entitled Securing Peace and 
Development: the Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform 
defines it as  
a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and 
evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of 
effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without 
discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (p. 6). 
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After a ten-year effort of revisiting and redefining the concept (Bryden 2007), the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD defines it in its 2007 Handbook 
on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice as processes and procedures 
dedicated to the reform of the security sector 
which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working 
together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent 
with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus 
contributes to a well functioning security framework (p. 20).  
 
In general, the DAC’s definition seems to capture the essence of multiple 
characterizations, and is the one that most scholars, bilateral donors, and international 
organizations adopt or reference for guidance. In this regard, therefore, the OECD has 
established itself as an important actor in SSR efforts. 
Second, there is a lack of consensus on what exactly constitutes the “security 
sector.” Nevertheless, two conceptualizations have emerged: broad and narrow (Hänngi 
2004). The latter are predominantly state-centric and focus primarily on actors that have a 
monopoly on the use of coercive power and are charged with protecting civilians and the 
state from violence from both internal and external threats. In such instances, the police, 
the military, paramilitary forces, border guards, national guards, customs authorities and 
intelligence agencies, as well as the bodies that oversee them (e.g. presidential and prime 
ministerial offices, ministries of interior, defense) are under scrutiny for reorganization 
and reform (McFate 2008).  
The broader view includes the roles of justice and law enforcement institutions 
(judiciary, justice ministries, prisons and correctional services, criminal investigation and 
prosecution services/bodies) and what are often referred to as “non-statutory security 
actors”, including liberation and guerrilla armies, private security firms and political 
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party militias (Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2000; Bailes 2008; Hänngi & Scherrer 2008). 
In general, the trend seems to be one of expanding the scope of the term to include more 
than traditional state security forces, such as the military and police, and to explicitly 
factor in the role of justice as well as non-state actors (Hänngi & Scherrer 2008). 
Evidence for this more expansive view is noted in the guidelines of the DAC-OECD’s 
Handbook on Security System Reform. It defines the security sector as: 
core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, 
customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security 
management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, 
financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and 
law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, 
traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security 
companies, guerrilla armies and private militia) (p. 5). 
 
 Our focus here is on police reform, the most public face of the state’s security 
sector and the one that citizens are most likely to encounter on a day to day basis. In post-
conflict settings “democratic policing” involves reform so that the police serve the public, 
rather than the state (Alderson 1994; Mendes et al. 1999; Stone & Ward 2000; Bayley 
2001; Caparini & Marenim 2004; Collantes Celador 2005; Wiatrowski et.al. 2008).  
Legitimacy, professionalism, respect for human rights and accountability are the central 
goals of creating a democratic policing system (Bayley 2001; Caparini & Marenim 
2004).6
Thus, in spite of the contested nature of the concept of SSR, including its scope, 
there is no shortage of analyses of SSR focusing on particular cases (Hood 2006; Ginifer 
2006; Vetscherra & Damian 2006; Bernabéu 2007; Edmunds 2007; Murray 2007; Davis 
2009; Sierra 2009), and the role of external actors (Caparini 2003; Vetschera & Damian 
2006; Bryden 2007; Haglund 2007; Ghebali 2007; Spence & Fluri 2008; Tadesse 2010).  
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The latter is the focus of this discussion. In many post-conflict situations, SSR is 
directed, assisted and/or instigated by external actors. Apart from the UN, the most active 
in the field of SSR are the EU, OECD, Council of Europe (CoE), and the OSCE. In this 
so-called “Euro-Atlantic cluster” of cooperation, the principles and techniques of SSR are 
more developed than for other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g. World Bank) 
interested in development issues that overlap with SSR. 7 Within this group, the EU has 
the most extensive track record. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) established 
SSR as an objective in the EU’s overall security framework.  Much happened in the 
interim. A 2006 workshop sponsored by the Slovak government and Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) dedicated to developing an SSR 
framework for the UN singled out the EU as “potentially the most important resource 
provider for SSR programmes” (Intergovernmental Approaches to SSR 2006, p. 9). In 
fact, by 2006, the EU provided SSR-related support (i.e. capacity building, technical 
assistance, norm development) in over seventy countries and in a range of environments.8
Given the EU’s expansive and expanding understanding of security and its link to 
a variety of other EU concerns (e.g. development, human rights and human security), 
security sector reform is considered a “cross-cutting” issue for all EU institutions 
(Sherriff 2007; Law & Myshlovska 2008). Notwithstanding the absence of a cohesive 
SSR strategy for the entire EU, as well as differences in how the European Commission 
and the Council conceptualize SSR, both rely on the OECD DAC guidelines, share the 
same definition of SSR and are guided by the same SSR principles (Sherriff 2007; Law & 
Myshlovska 2008; Sierra 2009). In sum, the EU’s involvement in SSR reveals several 
interlocking agendas: conflict prevention, crisis management, good governance and 
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enlargement (Sherriff 2007). This reflects a similar trend noted by Albrecht & Buur 
(2009, p. 393) in the SSR community at large, where it has become increasingly more 
common “to conceptualise and operationalise connections between security, 
development, justice and democracy”. 
 In spite of this impressive evolution in both bodies of literature, there are still 
many questions in need of answers. One such question revolves around the relationship 
between security sector reform and transitional justice in post-conflict settings. Thus far, 
only a few have explored the explicit linkage between the two (van Zyl 2005; Dhungana 
2007; Mobbek 2006; Loden 2007; Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie 2009; Davis 2009). This is 
noteworthy because, as  Mobbek (2006, p. 6) asserts, both SSR and transitional justice 
share three goals: accountability, capacity-building and strengthening the rule of law, and 
deterrence. Accountability is ensured by careful vetting of individuals employed in the 
security sector and, once a functioning judiciary is established, by holding those who 
committed human rights violations criminally accountable; capacity-building and 
strengthening the rule of law is part and parcel of retraining, reforming and retooling 
institutions associated with the security sector so that they embrace democratic norms; 
finally deterrence can be fostered by establishing oversight mechanisms and transparency 
in the security sector. And since both are concerned with coming to terms with violent 
legacies of conflict, and the institutions that frequently facilitated and/or promoted the 
conflict, the link between them is arguably the clearest when it comes to the reform of 
criminal justice organizations in post-conflict settings, namely police, the judiciary, the 
military, intelligence services, the penal system, and the bodies that oversee those 
institutions (Mobbek 2006, p. 5).  
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Moreover, Van Zyl (2005) points out that integrating transitional justice 
mechanisms into SSR, such as “targeted prosecutions” for those who are most 
responsible for human rights violations, combined with sound vetting programs and well 
supported truth commissions that carefully document human rights abuses from the past 
can serve the overall goals of SSR (p. 218). In so many words, SSR and transitional 
justice are linked in their goals of reforming the security sector so that the actors that 
comprise it are governed by the rule of law, trusted by individuals, and are dedicated to 
the protection of individuals, not harming them. The relationship between the two is 
unambiguously stated in the OECD-DAC’s Reference Document Security System Reform 
and Governance (2004), noting that 
[t]he security system reform policy agenda also includes the issue of “transitional 
justice.” Justice mechanisms may be used during a transition from war to peace to 
address issues related to the large numbers of offenders and victims that may 
threaten long-term peace and stability. This is particularly important in post-
conflict countries where perpetrators who have participated in human rights 
violations may remain in a community with impunity due to insufficient capacity 
of judicial or security institutions (p. 21). 
 
Police Reform in Kosovo 
From 1974 to 1989, Kosovo was an autonomous province in the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia with its own regional police force. When Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked 
by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in 1989, most of the Albanian officers were 
expelled or resigned, the police force of the province was abolished, and law enforcement 
authority was transferred to the Serbian Ministry of the Interior in Belgrade. Following 
the loss of autonomy, many Kosovar Albanians lost their jobs, were denied education, 
and were discriminated against (O’Neill 2002). Many war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, including the killing of civilians, torture, and sexual crimes, were committed 
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by the Serbian police, army, and paramilitaries before and during NATO’s military 
intervention in 1999. As O’Neill (2002, p. 25) notes, “the violence perpetrated against 
Albanians was planned and organized at the highest levels of Serbian authority”. 
In the immediate aftermath of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, 
the security situation did not look promising. In the pre-war context, the police and the 
justice system were “almost entirely Serbian” (O’Neill 2002, p. 22). In the post-conflict 
environment, the development of a local policing capacity became a top priority. Due to 
initial problems with deployment capabilities for UNMIK, KFOR initially assumed 
responsibility for policing tasks. Gradually, as the number of UNMIK Police increased, 
UNMIK acquired primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, but not 
until after 2002 (Rausch 2007; Stromseth et al. 2006). In the meantime, plans were 
developed to recruit and train local police officers. The minority participation target was 
set as 15%.9 In order to increase the number of local police officers working with the 
UNMIK Police, “a significant number of former Kosovo police officers expelled by the 
Federal Government in 1989 and 1990” were recruited and received accelerated training 
on human rights principles and democratic policing practices.10
Under UNMIK, the responsibility for the KPS was shared between pillar I – 
Police and Justice Pillar led by the UNMIK and pillar III – Democratization and 
Institution-Building Pillar led by the OSCE. On 21 May 2001, with the formal launch of 
the Police and Justice pillar, the UNMIK Police and the Department of Judicial Affairs 
were realigned into one structure.
 
11 The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government also recognized the significance of international oversight, and hence, 
allowed the justice and police affairs to be the sole responsibility of the SRSG.12 With 
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pillar I, UNMIK focused on creating a multinational police force and a judicial system. 
Following the disbandment of pillar I in May 2006, the KPS came under the authority of 
UNMIK’s Police Commissioner with oversight provided by the SRSG.13 Additionally, 
under pillar III, the OSCE was responsible for training the KPS members through the 
KPSS in Coordination with UNMIK Police Commissioner.14 In the words of the Minister 
of Internal Affairs, “KPS started as OSCE’s baby”, as the OSCE took responsibility for 
initiating the police component.15
At the beginning of the police reform process, the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) demanded that its members constitute the entire KPS. Following negotiations 
between the UNMIK, KFOR and the KLA, an agreement was reached in September 
1999. According to the agreement, 50% of the KLA members would be recruited as 
members of the KPS.
 
16 Applicants for the KPS had to be between the ages of 21 and 56, 
have at least a secondary school education, be a resident of Kosovo, be physically and 
mentally fit, and have no criminal history.17 The screening process conducted by the 
OSCE involved an oral interview, a written examination, a psychological test, a medical 
exam, and a background investigation. The screening process conducted by OSCE 
involved an oral interview, a written examination, a psychological test, a medical exam, 
and a background investigation (O’Neill 2002, p. 111). Vetting was an important 
component to ensure that extremist elements were excluded from the final selection of 
police officers and that a fine balance was achieved with the inclusion of female officers 
and multiple ethnic groups. Most of the applicants for the police force were eliminated 
based on the background checks and the outcome of the written examination. 
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In addition, the OSCE took over the KPSS in Vushtrri (Vucitrn) in July 1999 and 
recruited experienced trainers from its member states. As there was an urgent need for an 
increased number of local police officers, the initial training was kept relatively short: the 
first class of 176 officers graduated on 16 October 1999 after six weeks of basic 
training.18 This was followed by 19 weeks of field training.19 The original basic training 
course was further extended to eight weeks, then to 12 weeks. It currently lasts for 20 
weeks, which is followed by an additional 20-week training period in the field.20 By 
December 2004, the OSCE vetted, recruited, trained and deployed more than 6,000 KPS 
officers.21 To reach the minority participation target, an aggressive recruitment process 
was given high priority.22
Under UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, the KPS was set to serve under the authority 
SRSG with the supervision of UNMIK Police. It was designed to act in a “supporting 
role” in crime prevention and public protection and safety, with the eventual goal of 
“gradually assuming additional responsibilities for the maintenance of law and order.”
 Initially, some minorities did not feel comfortable travelling to 
and living in Vushtrri (Vucitrn). During the first few classes, only about half of the 
minorities accepted into the KPS reported for training. As an indicator of how 
uncomfortable minorities were, KFOR provided armed escorts for the Kosovo Serbs to 
accompany them to training and back (O’Neill 2002, p. 112). Over time, this practice was 
discontinued as the security situation became stabilized and the trust-building efforts 
between the different ethnic communities yielded success.  
23 
As planned, the KPS gradually took over duties from the UNMIK Police. For instance, 
the KPS increasingly assumed responsibilities for beat patrols, station management, 
traffic services, community policing, close protection units, border policing, and police 
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administration and training.24
Instead of waiting for a resolution of the final status question, UNMIK followed a 
policy of “standards before status” and established the Standards for Kosovo document in 
April 2002, designed to achieve some progress in meeting various domestic benchmarks, 
such as establishing functioning democratic institutions and the rule of law, creating a 
more tolerant multi-ethnic society, improving levels of public sector performance, and 
promoting good governance.
 By the end of 2001, the KPS started running independent 
operations, including regular patrols, internal investigations into professional standards, 
and murder investigations. Yet, it remained answerable to UNMIK, not to the PISG.  
25 This document in turn was implemented through the 
Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (2004), which set March 2006 as a deadline for 
finalizing the transfer of all stations and regional headquarters from UNMIK’s control to 
KPS control.26
Accordingly, between 2004 and 2006, UNMIK continued with the transfer of 
competencies to PISG to ensure local involvement in rule of law and security affairs. An 
important part of this transfer was the establishment of the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs by UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/53 of 20 December 2005.
  
27 
In line with the “local ownership” principle, these ministries were given legal, technical, 
financial and administrative responsibilities in relation to police and justice, with the 
SRSG closely monitoring appointments. However, until Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in February 2008, the bulk of the responsibilities for these ministries 
remained administrative in nature, instead of executive. As planned, by early 2006, five 
out of six regions were transferred to the operational control of the KPS commanders.28 
The reassignment of more important responsibilities, such as operational control over the 
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KPS, took place following a positive assessment by SRSG in the first few months of 
2006, such that most police stations and many departments were transferred to KPS 
control in 2006.29
Initiated by the SRSG in 2006, the first Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) of 
Kosovo was conducted with the goal of preparing a “template on which the security of 
Kosovo can be constructed.”
  
30 It was compiled in cooperation with the Kosovo 
Government, IGOs and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
According to the 2006 ISSR Public Opinion Poll results, there was “general satisfaction 
with the level of police development” among the people of Kosovo.31 Yet the results also 
indicated some areas of concern. It pointed to the distrust of KPS as a multiethnic force 
by Kosovo Serbs.32 While some Kosovo Serbs felt that the KPS was performing well, 
many believed that KPS did not adequately serve the needs of their community.33 
Corruption, politicization of the police, and the lack of effective parliamentary oversight 
from Kosovo’s National Assembly were identified as potential problems for KPS.34 
Weaknesses in the top leadership, the small pool from which all transfers to specialist 
departments and promotions were drawn, and “the constant movement of key personnel” 
were identified as problems endangering the institutional stability and hindered strategic 
thinking.35
The ISSR also highlighted training and recruitment as two of the most important 
issues for the KPS’s future effectiveness. In 2006, an estimated 20% of KPS officers had 
 It concluded by recommending continued capacity building of the KPS in the 
area of management. Since the rapid promotion of the senior officers was identified as a 
problem, the report encouraged these officers to remain in positions for a longer period of 
time and for their skills to be tested.  
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previous police experience from the Former Yugoslavia. While experience is important, 
there was the problem of some KPS officers viewing the police force as an expression of 
power, not of service to citizens, a direct challenge to the concept of democratic policing. 
They were also criticized for being too reliant on the chain of command and too reluctant 
to introduce innovation.36 On top of all that, under UNMIK, senior managers received no 
training. The ISSR identified this as a problem for the reputation of the KPS among 
civilians.37 Even though the percentage of senior officers and officials from former 
Yugoslavia has steadily decreased (in part due to retirements), the report noted “a 
managerial weakness” that still “handicaps” the KPS’s successor, the KP today.38
Following a diagnosis of many of the problems that were haunting the institution-
building process in Kosovo’s security sector, there was an increased momentum for a 
more successful reform process. Accordingly, oversight of the KPS was made a priority 
of the international community and the Kosovar authorities. From September 2005 to 
December 2007, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo conducted the Police Inspectorate of 
Kosovo (PIK) Implementation Project. The PIK was established as an independent 
civilian oversight mechanism that aimed at ensuring accountability and transparency 
within the KPS. PIK performed an “inspection function”, scrutinizing the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and compliance with the law of every station and department of KPS. 
Additionally, it investigated all allegations of serious misconduct by KPS officers of all 
ranks.
 
39
Post-Independence Declaration Period 
 
Immediately after the declaration of independence in 2008, the National 
Assembly adopted the Laws on the Police and on the Police Inspectorate in February 
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2008, and the oversight tasks were transferred to the locally managed PIK, under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs.40
There is continuous training of officers at the basic, advanced, and specialized 
levels. Basic training includes basic law enforcement training, which currently lasts for 
20 weeks, followed by 20 more weeks of field training.
 The KPS was renamed the Kosovo Police (KP) and the 
KPSS was renamed the Kosovo Centre for Public Safety and Education and converted 
into an executive agency of the Ministry of Interior in March 2008. It continues to 
educate the cadets on police, customs, emergency, and correctional training.  
41 So, after 40 weeks of basic and 
field training, the recruited cadets become full-fledged police officers. They continue 
receiving advanced and specialized training, which used to be overseen by external actors 
in the beginning of the reform process. However, recently, the KP started developing a 
“domestic capacity” in specialized training, “for sustainability purposes”.42
After the Kosovo Constitution came into force in July 2008, EULEX took over 
the Police and Justice pillar from UNMIK. EULEX is the largest civilian mission that is 
ever conducted under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
of the EU. It has a significant symbolic importance for the EU as it represents a new step 
for it to present itself as an important security actor in world politics. With EULEX, the 
EU is determined to take over post-crisis management tasks in Kosovo. Given the EU’s 
failure to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, its performance now is both an attempt to 
make up for past failures and a test for the success or failure of CSDP and Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  
  
The central aim of EULEX is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the 
rule of law area, specifically in the areas of the police, the judiciary and customs.43 Its 
 19 
key priorities are to address immediate concerns regarding protection of minority 
communities, corruption and the fight against organized crime. EULEX also has some 
“executive powers in the broader field of rule of law, including the ability to investigate 
and prosecute serious and sensitive crimes, such as war crimes and serious financial 
crimes”.44
The initial objective was for EULEX to replace UNMIK. But this created an 
outcry from both Belgrade and Prishtina. The Serbian Government was concerned about 
the replacement of the mandate of UNMIK, and the Kosovo Government was concerned 
about the implications for its administrative authority. Consequently, the EU started using 
the term “reconfiguration” of UNMIK, rather than “replacement” of UNMIK. In August 
2008, UNMIK and EULEX signed a memorandum transferring responsibilities from 
UNMIK to EULEX in the areas of justice, police and customs. Drafting compromise on 
the issue, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon proposed a “six-point plan” in November 
2008, regarding the issues of reconfiguration and EULEX deployment. While officials in 
Belgrade accepted the proposal, the Kosovar Albanian leadership rejected it. According 
to the plan, police, customs officers and judges in the north of Kosovo would remain 
under UNMIK command, while their Albanian counterparts would work with 
EULEX. Prishtina rejected it and argued that it would amount to a de facto partition of 
Kosovo.
  
45
The EULEX police component began monitoring, mentoring and advising its 
Kosovo counterparts in December 2008.
  
46 On the issue of policing, EULEX 
communicates with the Director of Police, but does not interfere with the operational 
processes of KP. There are weekly meetings with EULEX to harmonize efforts for joint 
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actions between the EULEX and the Kosovo Government.47
Recruitment into the KPS/KP 
 EULEX plays only an 
advising role in all but the northern part of Kosovo. However, in the north, EULEX 
acquired and still retains executive powers formerly exercised by UNMIK. Indeed, as 
part of the plan of localizing as much policing as possible, UNMIK’s role has been 
significantly reduced over time so that it has very few areas of exclusive competence. 
However, it is important to note that the reputation and the image of EULEX are very 
weak in Kosovo. This has important implications for the overall success of police reform 
as EULEX’s legitimacy is increasingly questioned.   
Initially, UNMIK and the OSCE, and then the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
EULEX did a very good job of directing the recruitment into the police force in Kosovo. 
From the beginning, the emphasis was on keeping both the female and the minority 
representation at targeted levels of 15%. Fortunately, the KPS had a promising start with 
the composition of the inaugural class of the KPS School in1999, which included 90% 
Albanian and 10% non-Albanian cadets (See Table 1).48 The KPS continuously worked 
on increasing its support from the local community to recruit minorities into the force. It 
employed a rigorous public relations campaign, which involved distributing handouts and 
publishing advertisements in different languages throughout Kosovo. By June 2001, 
3,847 basic recruits graduated from the KPS School and the initial minority recruitment 
target of 15% was met, and the mission shifted its focus from basic training to more 
specialized training to ensure the successful eventual transfer of power from UNMIK 
Police to the KPS.49  
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The first ethnically mixed patrols in the KPS started in August 2002.50 Until 
2002, the only part of Kosovo where the KPS officers were not deployed was the 
northern part of Mitrovice (Mitrovica). However, beginning in September 2002, UNMIK 
started successfully recruiting Kosovo Serbs from that region into the KPS. Accordingly, 
about three years after NATO’s military intervention, the KPS successfully established its 
authority over the whole of Kosovo.51 And, as more KPS officers were recruited, trained, 
and deployed throughout Kosovo, the number of parallel institutions was reduced, at least 
up until the declaration of independence which halted progress on that front. 52 
Nevertheless, by late 2002, KFOR began transferring border policing responsibilities to 
UNMIK Police and the KPS. As KPS numbers rose UNMIK downsized its policing.53
Against the background of these improvements, on the 17th and 18th of March 
2004, violent riots broke out throughout Kosovo due to “inaccurate reports that Serbs had 
been responsible for the drowning of three young Albanian children”.
 
Consequently, over time, UNMIK Police assumed more of a supporting and monitoring 
role, while retaining overall supervisory authority until the transfer of its mandate to 
EULEX in 2008.  
54 During the 
March 2004 violence approximately 100 KPS officers were identified “as the subject of 
allegations of misconduct.”55 Though relatively small in numbers, the events raised 
questions about professionalism in the KPS. Another criticism that surfaced was the lack 
of effective coordination between the KPS and UNMIK Police.56 In the immediate 
aftermath of the riots, many Kosovo Serb KPS officers left their positions to protest the 
violence. But eventually they returned to their jobs and ethnically mixed patrols, a 
significant accomplishment in reforming the police, resumed in July 2004.57 The July 
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2004 Report of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council on UNMIK addressed 
the incident and concluded that “overall professional conduct of the Kosovo Police 
Service during the violence was a significant indicator of the professional growth of the 
Service.”58
Nonetheless, the March 2004 events served as a wake-up call for the KPS. The 
establishment of specialized police units for crisis-management became a priority.
  
59 A 
Kosovo Security Advisory Group was established bringing together the PISG, 
representatives of all ethnic communities, UNMIK and KFOR. After an initial meeting 
on July 13, 2004 the group’s meetings stalled as Belgrade refused the participation of 
Kosovo Serbs.60
As Table 1 shows, between 2004 and 2007, ethnic representation in the KPS 
remained quite stable, with slightly less than 10% Kosovo Serb representation and 
slightly less than 6% representation by other ethnic minorities. However, the unilateral 
declaration of independence in 2008 complicated the steady progress made. In the wake 
of the declaration of independence, Belgrade put pressure on the Kosovo Serb members 
of the KPS to leave their jobs. Accordingly, over 300 Kosovo Serb officers boycotted the 
KP in a number of Kosovo Serb areas in southern Kosovo where operational police 
competencies were transferred to the Kosovo Ministry of the Internal Affairs. Unwilling 
to accept the authority of the Government in Prishtina, they declared that they would no 
longer recognize the KP chain of command and demanded to be placed under the direct 
command of UNMIK.
 
61 They did not return back to their duties for about one and a half 
years. In response, these officers were temporarily suspended from duty and replaced by 
UNMIK Police officers. In the northern part, the Kosovo Serbs officers did not resign 
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from the police force, but broke off communication with the chain of command, declined 
to report to the Government in Prishtina, and retained the old UNMIK KPS insignia.62 
Thus, the operational police competencies remained in the hands of UNMIK in northern 
Kosovo, until EULEX reached its full operational capability in April 2009.63
The boycott of the KP by Kosovo Serbs posed a serious challenge for the 
multiethnic composition of the force and was a major setback for the reconciliation 
aspects of transitional justice in Kosovo. The 2008 Kosovo Constitution states that the 
“security institutions shall reflect the ethnic diversity of the population of the Republic of 
Kosovo”
  
64 and emphasizes the need for the “civilian and democratic control over security 
institutions.”65 For these new institutions to be regarded as effective and unprejudiced by 
all communities in Kosovo, a multiethnic representation is vital. In the first two UN 
Secretary General reports following the declaration of independence, minority 
representation within KPS appeared to remain roughly constant.66 However, the numbers 
are somewhat misleading because the data were derived from the payroll and included 
the Kosovo Serbs who were still paid, but not reporting to work.67 And in a further 
provocative move, suspended Kosovo Serb police officers, who were officially 
boycotting the KP since the declaration of independence, signed contracts with Serbia’s 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) in April 2009 to receive salaries of approximately 
€340 from Belgrade from the MUP’s payroll.68 Kosovo’s Government and EULEX set a 
June 30, 2009 deadline to end the boycott. The Serbian Government took a constructive 
approach in response to the pressures from the EU and met the deadline. Serbia’s 
Ministry of Finance cancelled the payments and encouraged Serb members of KP to 
return to work.69 Encouragingly, most of the Serb officers returned back to their duties, 
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“after realizing that they would lose their jobs and that Serbia could not financially 
support them.”70 EULEX monitored, mentored and advised the KP during the 
reintegration of Kosovo Serb police officers into the service.71 Of the 325 Kosovo Serb 
police officers who stopped reporting to their duty stations, 317 returned to work by the 
deadline.72 However, in the northern part, Serb police officers continued receiving their 
salaries from UNMIK and EULEX, not from Prishtina, further underscoring the fragility 
of integrating the force and the political sensitivity of Belgrade toward the project.73 In 
2010, the Kosovo Serb officers reintegrated into the KP after the June 2009 deadline 
were surveyed by the UN. While two-thirds of the 100 officers surveyed expressed their 
satisfaction with the reintegration process, many complained about problems with the 
“quality of KP management, information flow, political interference, and equal treatment 
for staff from non-majority communities.”74
Currently, the KP has more than 9,000 officers, with approximately 16% minority 
representation due to its “affirmative action policy”
  
75 [See Table 1 in the appendix]. 
Moreover, a Kosovo Serb police officer was recently appointed to the senior position of 
Deputy General Director of Kosovo Police, a move aimed at easing the anxieties of the 
Kosovo Serb population and to demonstrate that there is no discrimination against the 
ethnic minorities in the KP. The representation of Roma and Ashkali is very minimal, as 
they mostly lack the minimum required level of education for entry into the police force, 
i.e. secondary schooling.76
<Table 1 About Here> 
  
Obstacles to Police Reform 
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 Much of the recent reporting on the KP criticizes its poor management and the 
lack of senior leadership’s focus on training.77 There are also widespread concerns that 
the KP is politicized. Even though the 2008 EU Kosovo Progress Report found KP’s 
performance regarding the maintenance of order and combating minor crime in the 
majority-populated areas “satisfactory,” it criticized the lack of exchange in intelligence 
information between different KP structures, and the low salary levels.78 Three agencies 
report directly to the Minister of Internal Affairs: the KP, the Agency for Civil 
Registration, and the Police Inspectorate. As recently as July 2010, there was “confusion 
about who is responsible where” among these agencies. In order to resolve this 
confusion, clearer mandates are needed.79The 2008 Progress Report further noted that the 
police detention facilities do not meet international standards.80 Moreover, the KP’s 
capacity to fight against organized crime, fraud, human trafficking and drug trafficking is 
weak.81
In 2009, the Ministry of Internal Affairs established municipal councils for 
community security to reinforce relations between police, municipal authorities and local 
communities. As a result community policing efforts gained momentum. Nevertheless, 
lack of communication among the local police stations remains problematic. For instance, 
in northern Mitrovice (Mitrovica), four police stations do not report directly to Prishtina, 
limiting the effectiveness of fighting organized crime and conducting undercover 
operations in this area.
 The availability and possession of weapons by civilians remains a problem that 
the KP has so far been unable to resolve. 
82 Parallel structures here exacerbate the situation. As long as 
Serbia continues to exercise influence over the northern part of Kosovo, the integration of 
Serbian police officers remains difficult.83  
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A number of reports also point out that the KP is too small for the size of the 
population.84 The Minister of Internal Affairs has alluded to this concern as well, as more 
and more responsibilities are transferred to the KP. For instance, on 28 April 2010, the 
control of the Administrative Boundary Line with Albania was transferred from KFOR to 
KP. It was a significant event marking the positive achievements reached by KP in 
preparation and professionalism, as well as becoming more efficient in the execution of 
its tasks.85 But, as the KP assumes more control over border areas, additional officers will 
be needed to police the area. Aware of these new challenges, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs notes, “We have no army, so there is a need to increase the number of police 
officers.”86
The 2009 EU Progress Report noted that the KP lacks the capacity to develop 
strategic planning and fully implement an intelligence-led policing system.
  
87 Poorly paid 
and poorly equipped personnel constitute another problem.88 Recently, in February 2010, 
members of the elite special operations units protested the inadequate pay. Following 
negotiations with governmental authorities, the Kosovo Government promised to provide 
a 3.5 million Euro budget increase. In April 2010 the Government authorized another 3.5 
million Euros for salary increases, so that these two recent salary increases will add about 
80 Euros to the average officer’s monthly salary.89
Facilities for storing evidence are also not fully protected and poor 
communication channels with other law enforcement agencies pose additional challenges. 
The KP’s reputation suffered a significant blow during last year’s scandal revolving 
around a theft incident from the evidence room protected by the KP.
 The low salaries may potentially lead 
to corruption-related problems, from which KP has been immune for the most part. 
90 The incident was 
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widely covered in the news and underscored the weaknesses of the KP. There is also 
skepticism about political interference in the criminal justice process, corruption, and a 
widespread perception that “the security institutions cannot guarantee the protection of 
any person wishing to address these problems.”91
Finally, there are concerns about the KP’s ability to ensure public safety. If there 
is an outbreak of violence, the KP is the first line of defense. They are then supported by 
EULEX Special Police units and, if the situation deteriorates, KFOR will be brought in as 
a third line.
 
92
But apart from these operational and technical concerns, the big issue that hovers 
over the continued success of police reform is Kosovo’s sovereignty. Until this matter is 
conclusively and bilaterally resolved, the process of police reform will be hampered by 
uncertainty and setbacks. In spite of an important turning point in January 2009, when the 
KP created a mixed unit in northern Mitrovice (Mitrovica), consisting of 25 police 
officers (Kosovo Serbs, Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Bosnians), the problem of 
parallel structures in the north and conflicts over whether EULEX or UNMIK is in charge 
eclipse such notable accomplishments.
 Until the KP is able to provide such security on its own, its operational 
readiness will be questioned. 
93 And since EULEX has not deployed its police 
force in northern Kosovo, the area is “free for organized criminal gangs.”94
Furthermore, Kosovo Serbs are under tremendous pressure from the Serbian 
Government to not accept the authority of Kosovo’s central government. There are 
significant differences in attitudes towards the declaration of independence amongst the 
different ethnic groups in Kosovo. In the immediate aftermath of the declaration of 
independence in 2008, while 93% of the Kosovar Albanians said that independence had 
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“turned out to be a good thing”, 74% of the Kosovo Serbs indicated that they saw 
Kosovo’s independence as a “bad thing”. In 2009, the percentage of Kosovo Serbs with 
such negative assessment had risen to 80%. Similarly, fewer Kosovar Albanians (75%) 
now thought that independence had turned out well.95
The Transitional Justice-Security Sector Reform Nexus  
 Such problems hamper the 
transitional justice potential of the KP, as there are portions of the Kosovar society that 
are not willing to cooperate with the Government in Prishtina.  
A central challenge for Kosovo, and for all societies confronting massive human 
rights violations from the past, is to establish the rule of law, to reform institutions in 
order to cultivate civic trust and legitimacy in governing structures, and to promote 
reconciliation. The February 2007 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement prescribes multiple mechanisms and policies to promote peace, justice and 
reconciliation in Kosovo. For example, the Proposal’s Article 1.1 notes that Kosovo 
“shall be a multi-ethnic society, which shall govern itself democratically, and with full 
respect for the rule of law through its legislative, executive, and judicial institutions.” 
Moreover, Article 2.5 explicitly endorses a role for transitional justice, noting that 
“Kosovo shall promote and fully respect a process of reconciliation among all its 
Communities and their members. Kosovo shall establish a comprehensive and gender 
sensitive approach for dealing with its past, which shall include a broad range of 
transitional justice initiatives.”   
As noted above, transitional justice can take a variety of forms. Regardless of the 
mechanism(s) selected, the focus is on the rights of victims in the pursuit of peace, 
democracy and reconciliation. Reforming security sector is particularly important 
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because those who are often implicated in past abuses worked for the police, the military 
and other security agencies. In the case of building a new police force for Kosovo, the 
emphasis revolves around two large issues: building the infrastructure and cadet aptitudes 
for policing; and, recruiting individuals with personal integrity to ensure that suitable 
police candidates are not implicated in past human rights violations, and on building a 
multi-ethnic force as a means for integration and political reconciliation. After discussing 
the challenges of the former above, we now turn to the latter.  
Given the magnitude of violence during the civil war in Kosovo, the transitional 
justice issues are pressing. Indeed, during the war more than 10,000 Albanians were 
killed and over 850,000 driven from Kosovo between March and June 1999 as part of an 
ethnic cleansing campaign orchestrated by Serb forces.96 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) lists 2,047 people as still missing.97 Over 90% of the Kosovar 
Albanian population was displaced throughout 1999.98
[f]requently a Kosovo Albanian would be intimidated, injured or killed in full 
public view to enforce the departure of the other villagers. Houses were also 
looted and set alight. Those who refused to leave were often killed. The 
combination of shelling, shooting, burning, intimidation and killing created chaos 
and panic, with villagers running in fear of their lives. As one refugee expelled 
from Vranic/Vraniq (Suva Reka) in early April explained, the "police threatened 
the population and killed some to encourage others to leave.
 As an early OSCE Verification 
Mission Report of 1999 on human rights noted,  
99
 
 
Kosovo’s Serbs suffered immensely as well. It is estimated that between 60,000-220,000 
Kosovo Serbs left or were expelled and then suffered wide-scale acts of revenge by 
Kosovar Albanians in 1999-2000 including murder, expulsion, harassment and 
discrimination (Dugolli & Agimi 2009, p. 16).100  
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While there have been notable improvements in interethnic relations since 2001, 
parallel structures, including the police, continue to exist. Kosovar Albanians and Kosovo 
Serbs also continue to differ over versions of history, the trustworthiness and legitimacy 
of institutions, and the future status of Kosovo, all of which further hamper the process of 
reconciliation. Until these and other challenges are overcome, achieving the goals of 
transitional justice and SSR will remain partial at best. 
Further complicating matters, some experts note that while international 
intervention ended the war in Kosovo and helped stabilize the area so that the foundations 
for future peace and security could be established, it also generated a new set of 
problems, whereby “[t]he political situation that settled after the war, did not address the 
justice factor, did not address the massive human rights violations and a number of highly 
sensitive issues including missing persons. Some local experts argue that justice was 
sacrificed for the sake of stability” (Dugolli & Agimi 2009, pp. 17-18).  Moreover, 
transitional justice has been by and large managed and overseen by international actors 
due to a dearth of a “homegrown brand of human rights activities courageous enough to 
take on the tasks related to dealing with the past” (Dugolli & Agimi 2009, p. 26).  On the 
particular issue of vetting for the Western Balkans more generally, the Center for 
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) noted that 
…lustration101
 
 did not take place in the Western Balkans. Even in the cases where 
appropriate lustration laws were passed, the public authorities failed to implement 
them… The interest of the general public has been focused on other issues, and 
civil society was not strong enough to bring this issue to the fore…Most 
international actors involved in democracy building in the Western Balkans paid 
little or no attention to contested issues surrounding the dealing with the past. All 
of this had negative repercussion on democracy and the rule of law. 
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Furthermore, it found that vetting designed and coordinated by external actors, such as 
international organizations, “cannot be considered a success” (Hatschikjan et al. 2005, p. 
16). In sum, therefore, Kosovo is essentially playing “catch-up,” having to look back 
before it can move forward and doing so in the context of a very fragile peace and 
uncertain future.  
 Compared to many other post-conflict initiatives in Kosovo, building the 
KPS/KP has been widely identified in the international media as a “success story” of the 
international community.102  Indeed, as O’Neill notes, “[t]he Kosovo Police Service and 
its school in Vucitrn prove that multiethnicity is neither dead nor a pipe dream in 
Kosovo” (2002, p. 110). He further notes that the creation of the KPS/KP, “provides 
important lessons to Kosovars and internationals working there to construct a society 
based on the rule of law, tolerance and respect” (2002, p. 111).  The ability of 
international and local actors to inculcate a professional identity for police officers that 
trumps ethnic identity, and even gender to some extent, has provided the necessary glue 
for cultivating a delicate esprit de corps.103
As previously noted, international organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, 
were crucial in establishing the police force. The goal was that UNMIK Police would 
eventually be replaced by a home-grown multiethnic police force of individuals who 
were not implicated in past human rights abuses, and to provide an example for other 
institutions in Kosovo.
   
104 In line with developments in post-conflict police reform 
processes, the OSCE’s mandate was to provide “democratically oriented police training” 
(Bayley & Perito 2010, p. 45). It directed the recruitment and vetting of police candidates 
who underwent a careful, multi-stage vetting process, including an oral interview, a 
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written exam, a psychological test, a medical exam, physical agility test and background 
investigation. Failure to pass the written exam and background checks were the leading 
causes of rejections (O’Neill 2002, p. 116). These tasks were eventually transferred to 
local authorities as UNMIK and the OSCE phased out their presence at the local, regional 
and then headquarter levels.  
Vetting, now conducted by local authorities, continues for all new recruits. 
According to the Deputy General Director of the Kosovo Police, only the “best of the 
best” make it into the KP.105 In addition to a written and oral test, candidates undergo a 
physical and psychological test and submit to background investigation according to the 
professional standards by the so-called Background Investigation Unit, INTERPOL and 
EUROPOL. Indeed, there is a continuous vetting process for officers throughout their 
careers. If a police officer is transferred to a different position, the same screening 
process is applied.106 There is “zero-tolerance for failure.” 107
Another provision to ensure that no new recruits participated in any past human 
rights abuses is age limit. Initially, a small percentage of officers, approximately twenty 
percent, belonged to the former police force. Under the system in place before 1999, 
police officers could have been as young as 14 years old. Now applicants must be 
between 21 and 55 years old, and only after finishing secondary school do they become 
eligible for applying for the KP.
 Even if an applicant 
receives perfect scores for all but one phase of the process they will not be hired. While 
such high standards are admirable, the difficulty of achieving perfection in all areas, 
combined with continuing pressures to hire and to sustain the multiethnic character of the 
force could pose new problems. 
108 Even though the number of police officers that served 
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in the pre-1989 police force has diminished over time, cultural differences between the 
generation that served in the pre-1989 police force and the younger generations persist. 
While police officers recruited from the former Yugoslavian police were well-trained and 
experienced, there are concerns about the human rights sensitivities of this group, such as 
“blind obedience to commanders and unquestioned loyalty to the state” (O’Neill 2002, p. 
113). As time has passed, however, the number of holdover police officers has 
diminished. As they retire, they are replaced with younger recruits who are trained with 
an eye to preventing human rights abuses, establishing accountability, and promoting the 
overall legitimacy of the security sector. Still, the upper age range for applicants is high 
and poses the risk of older applicants having pasts that may need to be more scrupulously 
vetted. The day to day demands for policing and building a multiethnic force appear to 
currently eclipse any concern about this upper age limit for eligible officers, raising 
questions about whether it has fallen fall short on completely eliminating former 
combatants from its ranks.   
Ethnic minority representation in the KP is an improved model of the 
representation of various ethnic groups in the Kosovar society.109 As such, multiethnicity 
in the KP is described as “exemplary” by the Deputy General Director of Kosovo 
Police.110 Additionally, varying levels of minority representation are found in all levels of 
policing, including the higher levels of administration. In terms of the representation of 
women, currently 13.8% of KP personnel are female, a hugely important success story 
for Kosovo and the region more generally, especially considering the fact that there were 
no female officers in Kosovo’s police force before 1999.  
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All in all, despite the problems outlined thus far, the KPS/KP’s progress to date is 
impressive. Compared to other institutions in Kosovo, it ranks as a model of success for 
institution-building and SSR in Kosovo. This is mainly due to the well focused 
recruitment and vetting activities from the beginning stages of the post-conflict 
reconstruction activities, the international community’s attention to police reform, the 
availability of funding, and the willingness of the ethnic minorities to participate in the 
KPS/KP. Additionally, the KPS/KP has, from the very beginning, consistently engaged in 
trust-building efforts which helped build a certain level of confidence from different 
ethnic communities in Kosovo towards these institutions.111
Yet there are a number of problems that prevent a full-scale assessment of 
transitional justice in Kosovo. Vetting has been integral to the creation of the KPS/KP 
and trust in it has been consistently among the highest of all of Kosovo’s institutions 
since 2003. Details concerning how the process was carried out, the exact criteria for 
disqualification or retention, whether candidates had the right to appeal rejected 
applications, and how authority over this matter was determined at higher levels are 
lacking. They are important to get a better sense of what exactly transpired and to ensure 
that the process was carried out in a way that did not generate a host of new injustices. 
There are, as of yet, no systematic analyses of this aspect of Kosovo’s security sector 
reform endeavors. UNDP’s efforts to explore this aspect of transitional justice have been 
largely limited to parts of the former Yugoslavia that are now sovereign. Kosovo’s 
unsettled status complicates the picture. 
  
 In spite of these shortcomings, it is worth examining how the public interprets 
transitional justice efforts dating back to 2000. In so many words, does the security 
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sector, and in this case, the KPS, enjoy a measurable level of civic trust such that citizens 
feel that they have rights that are respected, that they are no longer victims of oppression 
and violence, and that they can count on the police to serve and protect them? While 
there is, as of yet, no conclusive polling data on this question, indeed public awareness 
about transitional justice and what it aims to accomplish is reported to be quite low in 
Kosovo, we can analyze some initial public attitudes about the goals of transitional 
justice and security sector reform based on a  2007 UNDP survey.112 A majority of 
respondents find the continued employment of public officials (political and 
administrative) who were practitioners of past abuses as unacceptable, with politicians 
considered more unacceptable than individuals employed in the police and military. 
Approximately 33% of respondents consider politicians from the Milosevic era as 
directly responsible for human rights violations. Over 60% of Kosovar Albanians and 
Kosovo Serbs view political leaders and supervisors, that is, those giving orders, as more 
responsible for human rights violations than those executing orders in the field.113
On the issues of vetting in the security sector, an overwhelming majority or 
respondents agreed that it was “absolutely unacceptable” that policemen previously 
employed in the abusive system serve in the KPS.
  
114 Kosovar Albanians are more 
insistent than Kosovo Serbs on this matter, with only 3% accepting the idea of former 
abusive police and military as employees in Kosovo’s institutions. Yet Kosovo Serbs are 
also overwhelmingly opposed as well, with 76% rejecting the proposition that former 
abusive officials should be employed in public offices. This is important because 
Kosovar Albanians indentified Serbian police (35%) and the Yugoslav army (32%) as the 
main perpetrators of war crimes and other human rights violations.115 The remaining 34% 
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identified Serb paramilitaries as most responsible for such crimes. Thus, while Kosovo 
Serbs do not see the picture the exact same way as their Kosovar Albanian neighbors, 
they share, by and large, the same view that police who are implicated past abuses, 
should have no future in public institutions.116
Thus, vetting officials in Kosovo should see the rigorous vetting of KPS/KP 
police and the willingness to disqualify candidates who are implicated in past abuses as a 
crucial step toward building civic trust in institutions and promoting reconciliation. 
Support from both Kosovo Serbs and Kosovar Albanians for these measures only 
reinforces their importance. Since the KPS/KP enjoys among the highest levels of public 
satisfaction of all public institutions in Kosovo by all ethnic communities dating back to 
2003,
  
117 this makes such efforts all the more significant. Yet in spite of the success story 
of the KPS/KP, concerns remain about its ability to uphold the rule of law, corruption 
within the force and increasing politicization.118
Conclusion 
 The danger here is that Kosovar 
authorities, in proudly noting their impressive accomplishments so far, let their guard 
down on these matters and potentially undermine much of the trust built over the last 
decade or so. 
Stabilization and reconstruction are inextricably linked to security, governance, 
law and order. In post-conflict societies it is vital that the new security infrastructures are 
carefully constructed, with special attention devoted to vetting, inter-ethnic balance in 
recruitment, and democratic oversight of the new security institutions. Kosovo is no 
exception to that. SSR and transitional justice have significant implications for generating 
enduring peace in post-conflict zones. Capacity building, transition, and ownership are 
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key principles in SSR (Meharg et al. 2010, p. 9). Vetting is one of the most significant 
dimensions of the process of establishing transitional justice in a post-conflict society.  
Trust-building between different ethnic communities is equally significant when it 
comes to the nexus between SSR and TJ. The KP and its predecessor have been engaged 
in such efforts for a very long time. So, it is reasonable to argue that the fruits of these 
efforts are slowly being reaped. The international community assisted Kosovo in laying 
the groundwork for building Kosovo’s police force. The ethnic minority percentages 
observed in the general Kosovar society are by and large mirrored in the KP, although to 
different degrees.119
In the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo, a fragile stability has been achieved, 
yet Kosovo remains a divided society. Confidence building measures are extremely 
important in tackling trust-related issues between former enemies. Without reconciliation, 
it is hard to conceive of a successful reconstruction outcome. Increasingly, local 
ownership is becoming the new norm, as the international community gradually hands 
over the control of institutions, including the security sector, to the local actors. 
Nevertheless, Kosovo still has problems with the uneven rule of law and a weak system 
of justice. Political interference in and the abuse of office are common in the police and 
the judicial systems.
 Indeed, the multiethnic KP serves as an example for other 
institutions in Kosovo, such as the Kosovo Security Force, which has less than one 
percent minority representation.  
120 It is important for the international community to retain some 
monitoring powers over the legal and institutional developments in the short run as 
Kosovo completes its process of police reform and deepens its transitional justice efforts 
to redress the wrongs of the past. 
 38 
Table 1: Recruitment Data: KPS/KP: October 1999 – March 2009 
 
DATE 
 
Total 
Graduating 
Officers 
(cumulative, to 
date) 
 
 
Albanian 
 
Non-Albanian 
 
Non-Albanian Break-Down 
 
Inaugural Class 
16 October 
1999 
 
173 
 
90% 
 
 
 
10% 
 
 
5.5%: Serbian (N=8) 
Muslim Slavs (N=3) 
Roma (N=3) 
Turks (N=3) 
 
 
18 September 
2000 
 
 
1,692 
 
87% 
 
13% 
 
No Data Available 
 
15 December 
2000 
 
 
2,516 
 
83% 
 
17% 
 
No Data Available 
 
 
7 June 2001 
 
 
3,847 
 
85% 
 
15% 
 
No Data Available 
 
15 December 
2001 
 
4,392 
 
84.2% 
 
15.8% 
 
8.5%: Serbian (N=375) 
Other minorities (non-specified)  7.3% 
(N=324) 
 
 
30 March 2002 
(18th class of 
cadets) 
 
4,521 
 
84.41% 
 
15.59% 
 
8.32%: Serbian 
3.54%: Kosovo Bosniac 
3.74%: other minority communities 
 
 
7 October 2002 
 
 
5,240 
 
85.23% 
 
14.78% 
 
8.11% Serbian (N=498) 
6.67% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=558) 
 
 
18 June 2003 
 
5,407 
 
84.26% 
 
15.74% 
 
9.51%: Serbian (N=495) 
6.24%: other minority communities 
(N=325) 
 
 
1 October 2003 
 
 
5,769 
 
84.36% 
 
15.64% 
 
9.41% Serbian (N=543) 
6.23% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=357) 
 
 
26 January 
2004 
 
 
5,704 
 
84.6% 
 
15.5% 
 
9.3% Serbian (N=529) 
6.2% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=352) 
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30 July 2004 
 
5,983 
 
84.5% 
 
 
15.5% 
 
9.5% Serbian (N=567) 
6% other ethnic minority communities 
(N=362) 
 
 
31 October 
2004 
 
6,282 
 
84.5% 
 
15.5% 
 
9.4% Serbian (N=593) 
6% other ethnic minority communities 
(N=380) 
 
 
30 April 2005 
 
 
6,238 
 
84.69% 
 
15.31% 
 
9.27% Serbian (N=578) 
6.04% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=377) 
 
 
25 January 
2006 
 
6,864 
 
84.5% 
 
 
15.5% 
 
9.67% Serbian (N=664) 
5.85 other ethnic minority communities 
(N=400) 
 
 
5 May 2006 
 
6,826 
 
84.5% 
 
15.5% 
 
9.65% Serbian (N=659) 
5.83% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=398) 
 
 
14 August 2006 
 
7,249 
 
84.05% 
 
15.95% 
 
10.17% Serbian (N=737) 
5.78% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=419) 
 
 
19 February 
2007 
 
7,215 
 
84% 
 
16% 
 
10.31% Serbian (N=744) 
5.7% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=411) 
 
 
1 March 2008 
 
7,106 
 
84.45% 
 
 
 
15.55% 
 
9.96% Serbian (N=708) 
5.59% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=397) 
 
 
27 October 
2008 
 
7,043 
 
84.48% 
 
 
15.52% 
 
10% Serbian  (N=704) 
5.52% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=389) 
 
 
9 March 2009 
 
7.070 
 
84.6% 
 
 
15.41% 
 
9.92% Serbian (N=701) 
5.49% other ethnic minority 
communities (N=388) 
 
Sources: Reports of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 
New York: United Nations Security Council, 23 December 1999 through 9 March 2009; UNDP (2006), 
Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review, p. 19, available at: 
http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/ISSR_report_eng_ver2.pdf, accessed 12 August 2010. 
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